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Abstract
Background: No country is fully prepared for a 1918-like pandemic influenza. Averting a pandemic of H5N1 influenza virus
depends on the successful control of its endemicity, outbreaks in poultry and occasional spillage into human which carries a case-
fatality rate of over 50%. The use of perimetric depopulation and vaccination has failed to halt the spread of the epidemic. Blanket
vaccination for all poultry over a large geographical area is difficult. A combination of moratorium, segregation of water fowls
from chickens and vaccination have been proved to be effective in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) since
2002 despite endemicity and outbreaks in neighbouring regions. Systematic surveillance in southern China showed that ducks
and geese are the primary reservoirs which transmit the virus to chickens, minor poultry and even migratory birds.
Presentation of the hypothesis: We hypothesize that this combination of moratorium, poultry segregation and targeted
vaccination if successfully adapted to an affected district or province in any geographical region with high endemicity would set
an example for the control in other regions.
Testing the hypothesis: A planned one-off moratorium of 3 weeks at the hottest month of the year should decrease the
environmental burden as a source of re-infection. Backyard farms will then be re-populated by hatchlings from virus-free
chickens and minor poultry only. Targeted immunization of the ducks and geese present only in the industrial farms and also the
chickens would be strictly implemented as blanket immunization of all backyard poultry is almost impossible. Freely grazing ducks
and geese would not be allowed until neutralizing antibodies of H5 subtype virus is achieved. As a proof of concept, a simple
mathematical model with susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) structure of coupled epidemics between aquatic birds (mainly
ducks and geese) and chickens was used to estimate transmissibility within and between these two poultry populations. In the
field the hypothesis is tested by prospective surveillance of poultry and immunocompetent patients hospitalized for severe
pneumonia for the virus before and after the institution of these measures.
Implications of the Hypothesis: A combination of targeted immunization with the correct vaccine, segregation of poultry
species and moratorium of poultry in addition to the present surveillance, biosecurity and hygienic measures at the farm, market
and personal levels could be important in the successful control of the H5N1 virus in poultry and human for an extensive
geographical region with continuing outbreaks. Alternatively a lesser scale of intervention at the district level can be considered
if there is virus detection without evidence of excess poultry deaths since asymptomatic shedding is common in waterfowls.
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Background
The influenza A H5N1 virus has caused diseases in over
200 human and the culling of millions of poultry. Most
human cases were recognized to be poultry-to-human
transmission [1]. Therefore the control of this virus
should be focused on the poultry side. Highly pathogenic
influenza A H5N1 virus was first identified in 1959
amongst the chickens of Scotland. The ancestor of current
poultry H5N1 strains, Goose/Guangdong/1/96, was sub-
sequently detected during an outbreak of highly patho-
genic avian influenza in the poultry of southern China in
1996. A year later in HKSAR, an outbreak of 18 human
cases with six deaths was preceded by massive chicken
deaths in farms and markets[2]. A series of control meas-
ures in HKSAR has successfully controlled the outbreak in
human and poultry. In 2003, a HKSAR family returned
from Fujian Province with two virologically confirmed
cases[3]. This was followed by a major outbreak in the
poultry and human of Southeast Asia which still cannot
be controlled by perimetric depopulation and vaccination
of chickens and is now spreading to Central Asia, Middle
East, Africa and also Europe. A consecutive four-year poul-
try surveillance in South China showed that virus isola-
tion rate started to rise when the ambient temperature was
below 20°C[4], and peaked when the temperature went
below 10°C. The virus is known to survive at a lower tem-
perature for weeks but less than a week at high ambient
temperature of 37°C in faecal materials[5]. Our recent
study suggests that the virus had been endemic in poultry
for about 10 years [6]. It demonstrated that asymptomatic
poultry maintain and amplify the viruses, and also serve
as infectious source for other farm poultry and migratory
birds, thereby maintaining and disseminating the out-
break. The virus was probably spread by both poultry traf-
ficking and migratory ducks and geese, which tend to
interact with domestic ducks and geese. The overall virus
isolation rate in asymptomatic market poultry is about
1% but 90% of these isolates came from geese and ducks.
Furthermore, monthly breakdown showed that isolation
in ducks and geese preceded those of the chicken and
minor poultry (Table 1). We hypothesize that the poultry
epidemic can be controlled by limiting geese and ducks to
in-house industrial farms with vaccination and by a one-
off 3 week moratorium of all poultry farming at the hot-
test month to interrupt the cycle of transmission.
Presentation of the hypothesis
Poultry surveillance at the peak of the 1997 HKSAR epi-
demic showed that 20% of market poultry were infected
by the virus.[7] The outbreak was controlled by the
depopulation of all 1.5 million of poultry across the terri-
tory. No live ducks and geese were subsequently allowed
to go into poultry markets because they are known to shed
the virus without symptoms. Besides enforcing the
accepted biosecurity measures in farms, a monthly mora-
torium or rest day with cleansing of all the poultry stalls
were introduced to interrupt the transmission cycle in wet
markets (Figure 1)[7]. In addition to biosecurity measures
at the wet markets, vaccination of all farmed poultry and
imported chickens was required to completely stop virus
isolation in HKSAR. In Thailand, a strong geographical
association was found between chicken outbreaks and
free grazing ducks[8]. The Thai government has success-
fully mobilized and educated 1.2 million volunteers who
reported on outbreaks in poultry which is one volunteer
per ten families to look for early signs of bird flu in every
village[9]. This huge team of public health volunteers has
allowed the enforcement of a combination of measures
which included early detection, culling poultry flocks,
restricting poultry movement, and improving hygiene for
the 1,417 affected villages in 60 of 76 provinces in 2004.
These measures have brought the outbreak partially under
control.
As a proof of concept, we developed a simple mathemati-
cal model of coupled epidemics between aquatic birds
(mainly ducks and geese) and chickens to estimate trans-
missibility within and between these two poultry popula-
tions. We used a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR)
structure for aquatic birds and susceptible-infected (SI) for
chickens, assuming for simplicity that all chickens die
after infection. The basic reproductive number, R0, is
defined to be the expected number of infections generated
by a single typically infectious aquatic bird or chicken in
an otherwise susceptible population [10]. Preliminary
results of the model show R0 = 1.14 and suggest that vac-
cinating ducks and geese would be a very efficient strategy
to reduce R0 where coverage of 14% of hatchling aquatic
birds, with no vaccination of chicken, might be sufficient
to interrupt a self-sustaining outbreak, i.e. R0 < 1 (Figure
Table 1: Number of poultry positive for influenza A H5N1 virus 
per population sample in one Chinese province over a 12-month 
period between 2004–2005.
Month Chicken Duck Geese Minor poultry*
Jul 0/127 0/117 0/60 0/0
Aug 0/147 4/264 0/3 0/0
Sept 0/70 1/204 2/93 0/35
Oct 0/117 8/234 2/57 0/0
Nov 0/151 5/206 4/150 0/0
Dec 4/139 9/163 6/118 0/0
Jan 2/130 14/197 7/91 0/0
Feb 3/134 8/172 5/99 1/17
Mar 0/124 6/207 0/69 0/21
Apr 0/128 1/219 0/52 0/21
May 0/130 0/246 0/75 0/30
June 0/110 0/262 0/90 0/021
* Minor poultry includes quail, pheasant, guinea fowl, pigeons are 
much lower in number and may not be available in the market for 
surveillance during some of the months.BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:132 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/132
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2)[11]. This does not necessarily mean that all transmis-
sion would be completely eliminated however in the
absence of adjunctive measures such as environmental
decontamination, control of importation of infected
poultry, and chicken vaccination in industrial farms.
Testing the hypothesis
Why such control measures should be work
We propose to test these control measure in a province or
a small district of any country highly endemic for influ-
enza A H5N1 in their poultry (Figures 3a and 3b).
Another province or district will be selected as the control
where current disease control measures would be contin-
ued as recommended by the government.
Selection of province or district
Although no major outbreak was observed recently, activ-
ity of H5N1 virus has been regularly detected from differ-
ent types of apparently "healthy" poultry in past years.
Thus the province or district selected should be the one
which largely exports and not imports poultry.
The team of officials and volunteers
Government officials, village chiefs, volunteers, and veter-
inarians are responsible for dissemination of information,
patrolling the enforcement of moratorium, taking of spec-
imens for virological surveillance, the repopulation of
chicken and minor poultry in backyard farms and report-
ing of outbreaks in backyards. The provincial or district
hospital superintendent, infection control team, micro-
biologists and clinicians are responsible for the clinical
and virological surveillance in immunocompetent
patients hospitalized for severe pneumonia.
One-off poultry-free moratorium of 21 days
August is the hottest month with the highest environmen-
tal temperature which will spontaneously eliminate the
virus shed into the environment. The government will
announce the moratorium 4 months before the date so
that all poultry are consumed or exported to other prov-
inces by the end of July. This will minimize the economic
loss of the farmers who can plan ahead for the morato-
rium.
Poultry re-introduction
After three weeks of moratorium of poultry in the prov-
ince or district, hatchlings of chickens and minor poultry
will be re-introduced from qualified central supplies
which can institute proper disinfection of the external sur-
face of the fertilized poultry eggs for a restart of poultry
farming. Mixed farming of chicken and duck and or geese
with chickens and minor poultry will be permanently
banned in the backyards. Geese and ducks will only be
farmed in an industrial setting.
Targeted immunization
Immunization of newly introduced poultry with stand-
ardized poultry vaccine will be implemented under the
Comparison of H9N2 isolation rate before and after the rest day in 7 live poultry markets in Hong Kong (July to September,  2001) Figure 1
Comparison of H9N2 isolation rate before and after the rest day in 7 live poultry markets in Hong Kong (July to September, 
2001). The reduction in isolation rates before and after the rest day in each month was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.01; Fisher's 
Exact test).
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supervision of a dedicated team of veterinarians and local
authority. A single type of vaccine with good track record
should be used for the whole province [12]. Though a
H5NX (X ≠ 1) vaccine is often recommended to facilitate
subsequent serological surveillance to distinguish
between natural seroconversion of poultry due to wild
type infection or the result of vaccination, the use of an
H5N1 vaccine antigenically matched to the circulating
strain should also be considered to improve efficacy. The
successful vaccination of duck and geese are confirmed by
adequate haemagglutination inhibition titre before they
are allowed to be freely grazing outside the pen.
Law enforcement
Import of live poultry into the province will be banned
but export of poultry will be permitted. All ducks, geese,
are banned in backyards after the moratorium. Biosecurity
of farms and markets are enforced to stop transmission
cycles between wild birds and farm birds, between farms
and between markets and farms. The supply chain of free
virus-free chick seedlings for re-population will be a joint
effort of the government and the industrial farms.
Virological surveillance, isolation and characterization
Comprehensive surveillance of poultry in the test and
control provinces or districts will be carried out to com-
pare the outcome of the control measures over a period of
spanning two winters. Cloacal, tracheal, and fecal samples
were collected once every seven days from apparently
healthy poultry in live-poultry markets. Virus isolates
would be antigenically and genetically characterized as
previously described [6].
All patients admitted to provincial or district hospitals for
severe community-acquired pneumonia who are previ-
ously healthy, under the age of 65 with no underlying
medical illness would be investigated for influenza A
H5N1 virus infection in addition to the locally accepted
routine investigations. Their throat swab and nasopharyn-
geal swab/aspirate are put into viral transport medium
Impact of vaccinating aquatic birds (mainly ducks and geese) on the transmissibility of H5N1 influenza in poultry of a province  in a South East Asian country Figure 2
Impact of vaccinating aquatic birds (mainly ducks and geese) on the transmissibility of H5N1 influenza in poultry of a province 
in a South East Asian country. Maximum likelihood estimate (solid line) was made using isolation rates of 1.8% for aquatic birds 
and 0.26% for chicken [7] (R0 = 1.24, αA = 0.06 and m = 1.86). Dashed lines reflect a simple sensitivity analysis. We refitted the 
model to the highest and lowest isolation rates not significantly different from 1.8% and 0.26% (with 95% confidence). For sim-
plicity, we assume aquatic birds and chickens mix freely, i.e. at any one time infections are not concentrated in only a few 
flocks. In this simple illustrative model, we did not account for the interaction between backyard flocks, industrial flocks, free 
ranging birds and wet markets. Note that these results are sensitive to the relative population sizes of the two groups (not 
shown). Therefore, further analysis of this system with a more detailed population structure is warranted.BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:132 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/132
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(A) Proposed transmission dynamics of influenza A H5N1 virus in wild birds and poultry Figure 3
(A) Proposed transmission dynamics of influenza A H5N1 virus in wild birds and poultry. (B) Proposed control measures focus-
ing on ducks and geese.
A.  
 
B 
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and sent to reference center for inoculation into MDCK
cell line and chick embryo. Their acute and convalescent
(14 days after onset of fever) sera would be tested for a
four-fold rise in neutralizing antibody titer against the
presently circulating genotype.
Implications of the hypothesis
Even developed countries may not be able to withstand a
rapidly spreading 1918-like influenza pandemic with a
mortality rate of over 50%. Thus early intervention by
quarantine of contacts, social distancing and rapid admin-
istration of a central stockpile of antiviral and vaccine to
the targeted population at the epidemic centre appears to
be a reasonable solution [13,14]. However it may be at
least four weeks before cases of human-to-human trans-
mission are reported to WHO due to the lack of infrastruc-
ture for epidemiological and virological surveillance in
developing countries. Given the wide distribution of the
endemicity of H5N1 virus in Asia, Middle East, Africa and
Europe, it is not possible to predict the site to emerge a
pandemic strain. Moreover, amantadine resistance was
found in isolates from some affected areas and oseltamivir
resistance have been detected in virus isolates before or
after treatment [15-17]. There may not be adequate vac-
cine available and it is also possible that the stockpiled
prototype vaccine may have a poor match to the pan-
demic strain. Despite the ability to rapidly scale up the
vaccine production capacity and the use of potent
immuno-adjuvant, at most only a third of the global
human population may have the chance of getting the
vaccine at least six months after the pandemic strain is
identified. These almost insurmountable difficulties in
pandemic preparedness and the present toll on poultry
strongly suggest that primary attention should be turned
to the control of the virus in the poultry while the virus
has only limited capability for poultry-to- human trans-
mission and before it changes to a pandemic strain. Until
recently, depopulation based on clinical surveillance is
the recommended field measure for the control of out-
breaks. However such measures rely on the willingness of
volunteers to report excess death especially in backyard
poultry. Yet these volunteers may not necessarily be as
willing to assist in enforcing more extreme preventive
measures outside the settings of an impending outbreak,
such as a moratorium or an embargo on raising geese and
ducks in backyard flocks. Since these measures are associ-
ated with considerable losses to families involved, com-
pensation must be given to the affected farmers in order
to gain their cooperation and compliance to this interven-
tion. Such extensive and prolonged efforts of surveillance
in the field and laboratory will require technical, financial
and administrative support from the developed countries,
charity funds and international bodies.
Wild waterfowl including migratory ducks and geese are
natural hosts of influenza A viruses. They could be asymp-
tomatic despite infection by highly pathogenic H5N1
strains due to their unique immune system, or if they are
previously exposed to other H5 viruses. Moreover highly
pathogenic H5N1 strains can revert or be selected to lowly
pathogenic strains when passaged in domestic ducks in
the laboratory. Thus the duck may serve as the "Trojan
horse" of H5N1 influenza viruses which continually to
spread new strains to other poultry such the chicken
wherein the virus may be selected to a highly pathogenic
form[18,19]. The exchange of virus between migratory
and domestic water fowls may have accounted for the
spread of H5N1 infection over a vast geographic distance.
Thus the water fowls especially the ducks and geese
should be the focus for control. Many recent human cases
were reported without concomitant findings of outbreaks
in poultry. Our hypothesis if proven to work at a provin-
cial level with poorly controlled outbreaks, can be
adapted to smaller size districts without excess poultry
deaths but virologically positive asymptomatic water-
fowls. However this will mean a huge burden on labora-
tory surveillance since regular sampling of dead poultry in
districts without excess poultry deaths have to be insti-
tuted.
Experience in the control of rinderpest in African cattle
showed that it was difficult to achieve an adequate herd
immunity by blanket vaccination, which may be wasteful
or impractical [20]. Moreover moderate herd immunity
with many asymptomatic virus shedders may actually
help to sustain viral transmission. Therefore ducks and
geese should only be reared in industrial farms where tar-
geted vaccination programme can be fully implemented.
The backyard virus is controlled by a one-off moratorium
at the hottest month and re-populated by chickens and
other minor poultry. As chickens and minor poultry are
usually symptomatic if they have not been partially vacci-
nated or previously exposed to other H5 subtype viruses,
they also serve as sentinel in monitoring the efficacy of
control of H5N1 virus in ducks and geese. Vaccination
programme in backyard farms is unlikely to be very effec-
tive unless the coverage is very comprehensive. It could be
potentially detrimental since the vaccine giver may be car-
rying the virus from backyard to backyard. Partial immu-
nity will only fuel the endemicity [20]. Therefore
vaccination of chickens and minor poultry in backyards
should be done if a good vaccination programme for
ducks and geese is already in place.
Biosecurity measures at industrial farm and markets must
be enforced to ensure that virus trafficking between those
epidemic centres is minimized. For the wet markets of
HKSAR, the ultimate goal is to go for central slaughtering
with no more live chickens in retail markets. In order toBMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:132 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/132
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decrease the resistance of the public and the poultry stall
owners to the change, a series of transitional measures for
prevention of avian influenza outbreaks have been imple-
mented in HKSAR since 1997. Live ducks and geese are no
longer allowed in the retail markets. Subsequently even
live quails are not allowed since they can be the potential
intermediate host for all subtypes of influenza viruses.
Our local farmed and cross border imported chickens
must be vaccinated against influenza virus H5 with suffi-
cient serum HAI titre and negative cloacal swab by H5 RT-
PCR before they are allowed into HKSAR or the wet mar-
kets. For local farms, biosecurity measures are tightened in
terms of sufficient geographical separation and the use of
bird-proof net. Chicken farms must not keep any other
bird species and pigs. Movement of chickens or feed
between farms is tightly controlled. Footwear is disin-
fected before entry to the farm. All staff must shower and
put on protective clothing before entering the production
area. Chickens from local farms should only be trans-
ported in disinfected cages to a designated local poultry
wholesale market. Vehicles that carry chickens from one
farm to the wholesale market are not permitted to carry
chickens or any other poultry from another farm. No
chickens that have been in a wholesale or retail market are
allowed to enter local farms to stop a transmission cycle
between the markets and the farms. All imported chickens
must come from registered farms recognized by the gov-
ernment department. At the wholesale and retail market
levels, market rest days (4 rest days for wholesale and 2
matching rest days for retail markets) are set up to break
the virus replication cycle and reduce the viral load in the
wet markets. During these rest days, all trading activities
are stopped, all live poultry in the retail outlet slaughtered
and the premises thoroughly cleansed and disinfected.
With these comprehensive measures at farms and mar-
kets, the perimetric depopulation can be reserved for the
control of any missed pockets of infection.
Unlike poultry, the role of wild birds in transmission dis-
ease to poultry or human is still poorly defined. Most
would agree that the migratory birds are at least partly
responsible for spreading the virus to poultry in widely
separated geographical regions along their flyways. At
least 10 dead birds were found to be infected with the
H5N1 virus every winter in HKSAR. Local wild birds,
migratory birds from the north and perhaps religiously
released birds are implicated as the source of the virus in
HKSAR (Personal communicaton by Richard Corlett).
Though very few human cases have resulted from expo-
sure to wild birds, the handling, slaughtering, defeather-
ing and preparing of wild birds for consumption in
endemic areas are considered as risk factors for acquisi-
tion of this disease. Due to outbreaks of disease in recrea-
tional park birds of HKSAR and their frequent contacts
with human, the publics are advised to avoid contact with
recreational park birds or wild birds. They should wash
their hands with soap or disinfectant after contact.
Though psittacine birds are generally more resistant to the
H5N1 virus, pet birds caged in high concentration at pet
bird shops should also be put under surveillance for out-
breaks. As the religiously released birds are often wild
birds caught in the mainland and smuggled into HKSAR,
most of them will die after their release due to maladapta-
tion to the new environment. Such activity should be
banned on the ground of humanitarianism and public
health. At the time of writing there is still no recommen-
dation on the use of vaccine to prevent outbreaks in recre-
ational park bird or pet birds due to the lack of
understanding on the highly variable immune response of
these highly diversified avian species to vaccination. In
one study, some of these pet birds showed poor response
to vaccination, whereas others such as the flamingos, ibis,
rheas, Congo peafowl, black-winged stilts, Amazon par-
rots, and kookaburras showed good response to an inacti-
vated H5N9 vaccine[21].
An effective poultry vaccine is one of the pillars in the pro-
posed intervention. Between 1997 and 2001, HKSAR had
failed to control outbreaks by relying on intensive clinical
and virological surveillance of farms and markets with
dedicated staff. Thus vaccination was used as a last resort
in addition to other control measures. If a high compli-
ance rate of vaccination can be achieved as in HKSAR, the
risk of asymptomatic viral shedding is minimized. How-
ever, even among the domestic poultry, there are signifi-
cant differences in their haemagglutination inhibition
antibody response towards the commonly used inacti-
vated H5 vaccines. Generally these vaccines has been
found to be quite effective in chickens but the haemagglu-
tination inhibition antibody titer tends to be lower in
ducks and geese especially when given during the first few
weeks of life when their immune system is relatively
immature. Furthermore, H5N1 virus has become morean-
tigenicallydiversified in the last couple of years, it would
be important to select antigenically matched or broadly
cross reactive vaccines to maintain the efficacy of vaccina-
tion. A surveillance program should be established before
and during the intervention to closely monitor the viro-
logical and serological results of vaccination. Similar to
the human seasonal vaccine, a panel of vaccine candidates
should be prepared and tested against many circulating
strains before large scale production and field testing are
done.
In summary, we proposed an intervention programme
based on the successful experience of HKSAR in the con-
trol of the H5N1 virus by a combination of targeted
immunization with the correct vaccine, segregation of
poultry species and a three week moratorium of poultry
farming (see additional file 1). This intervention, if suc-BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:132 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/132
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cessfully demonstrated at the provincial or district level in
the developing country with persistent outbreaks, can be
adapted at a much smaller scale for early intervention
once the virus is found even if there is no excess death in
the poultry population. But the later would require a
strong laboratory support and regular sampling of all
dead poultry. This may solve the present problem of
human diseases without excess death in poultry.
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